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For more than a century, physics has known of a puzzling conflict between the T-
asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomena and the T-symmetry of the underlying
microphysics on which these phenomena depend. This paper provides a guide to
the current status of this puzzle, distinguishing the central issue from various issues
with which it may be confused. It is shown that there are two competing concep-
tions of what is needed to resolve the puzzle of the thermodynamic asymmetry,
which differ with respect to the number of distinct T-asymmetries they take to be
manifest in the physical world. On the preferable one-asymmetry conception, the
remaining puzzle concerns the ordered distribution of matter in the early universe.
The puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow thus becomes a puzzle for cosmology.
1 The puzzle of temporal bias
Late in the nineteenth century, on the shoulders of Maxwell, Boltzmann and many
lesser giants, physicists saw that there is a deep puzzle behind the familiar phe-
nomena described by the new science of thermodynamics. On the one hand, many
such phenomena show a striking temporal bias. They are common in one temporal
orientation, but rare or non-existent in reverse. On the other hand, the underlying
laws of mechanics show no such temporal preference. If they allow a process in one
direction, they also allow its temporal mirror image. Hence the puzzle: if the laws
are so even-handed, why are the phenomema themselves so one-sided?
What has happened to this puzzle since the 1890s? I suspect that many con-
temporary physicists regard it as a dead issue, long since laid to rest. Didn’t it turn
out to be just a matter of statistics, after all? However, while there are certainly
would-be solutions on offer—if anything, as we’ll see, too many of them—it is far
from clear that the puzzle has actually been solved. Late in the twentieth century,
in fact, one of the most authoritative writers on the conceptual foundations of sta-
tistical mechanics could still refer to an understanding of the time-asymmetry of
thermodynamics as ‘that obscure object of desire’.1
One of the obstacles to declaring the problem solved is that there are several
distinct approaches, not obviously compatible with one another. Which of these, if
any, is supposed to be the solution, now in our grasp? Even more interestingly, it
turns out that not all these would-be solutions are answers to the same question.
There are different and incompatible conceptions in the literature of what the puzzle
of the thermodynamic asymmetry actually is—about what exactly we should be
trying explain, when we try to explain the thermodynamic arrow of time.
What the problem needs is therefore what philosophers do for a living: drawing
fine distinctions, sorting out ambiguities, and clarifying the logical structure of
difficult and subtle issues. My aim here is to bring these methods to bear on the
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puzzle of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics. I want to distinguish the true
puzzle from some of the appealing false trails, and hence to make it clear where
physics stands in its attempt to solve it.
Little here is new, but it is surprisingly difficult to find a clear guide to these
matters in the literature, either in philosophy or in physics. Accordingly, I think the
paper will serve a useful purpose, in helping non-specialists to understand the true
character of the puzzle discovered by those nineteenth century giants, the extent to
which it has been solved, and the nature of the remaining issues.a
2 The true puzzle—a first approximation and a popular challenge
Everyone agrees, I think, that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow stems from
the conjunction of two facts (or apparent facts—one way to dissolve the puzzle
would be to show that one or other of the following claims isn’t actually true):
1. There are many common and familiar physical processes, collectively describ-
able as cases in which entropy is increasing, whose corresponding time-reversed
processes are unknown or at least very rare.
2. The dynamical laws governing such processes show no such T-asymmetry—if
they permit a process to occur with one temporal orientation, they permit it
to occur with the reverse orientation.
As noted, some people will be inclined to object at this point that the conjunction
is merely apparent. In particular, it may be objected that we now know that the
dynamical laws are not time-symmetric. Famously, T-symmetry is violated in weak
interactions, by the neutral K meson. Doesn’t this eliminate the puzzle?
No. If the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics were associated with the T-
symmetry violation displayed by the neutral K meson, then anti-matter would
show the reverse of the normal thermodynamic asymmetry. Why? Because PCT-
symmetry guarantees that if we replace matter by anti-matter (i.e., reverse P and
C) and then view the result in reverse time (i.e., reverse T), physics remains the
same. So if we replaced matter by anti-matter but didn’t reverse time, any intrin-
sic temporal arrow or T-symmetry violation would reverse its apparent direction.
In other words, physicists in anti-matter galaxies find the opposite violations of
T-symmetry in weak interactions to those found in our galaxy. So if the thermo-
dynamic arrow were tied to the T-symmetry violation, it too would have to reverse
under such a transformation.
But now we have both an apparent falsehood, and a paradox. There’s an ap-
parent falsehood because (of course) we don’t think that anti-matter behaves anti-
thermodynamically. We expect stars in anti-matter galaxies to radiate just like our
own sun (as the very idea of an anti-matter galaxy requires, in fact). And there’s a
paradox, because if this were the right story, what would happen to particles which
are their own anti-particles, such as photons? They would have to behave both
thermodynamically and anti-thermodynamically!
aFor those interested in more details, I discuss these topics at greater length elsewhere.2,3,4
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Here’s another way to put the point. The thermodynamic arrow isn’t just a
T-asymmetry, it is a PCT-asymmetry as well. There are many familiar process
whose PCT-reversed processes are equally compatible with the underlying laws,
but which never happen, in our experience. We might be tempted to explain
this asymmetry as due to the imbalance between matter and anti-matter, but the
above reflections show that this is not so. So instead of the puzzle of the T-
asymmetry of thermodynamics, we could speak of the puzzle of the PCT-asymmetry
of thermodynamics. Then it would be clear to all that the strange behaviour of the
neutral K meson isn’t relevant. Knowing that we could if necessary rephrase the
problem in this way, we can safely rely on the simpler formulation, and return to
our original version of the puzzle.
3 Four things the puzzle is not
Some of the confusions common in debates about the origins of the thermody-
namic asymmetry can be avoided distinguishing the genuine puzzle from various
pseudo-puzzles with which it is liable to be confused. In this section I’ll draw four
distinctions of this kind.
3.1 The meaning of irreversibility
The thermodynamic arrow is often described in terms of the ‘irreversibility’ of many
common processes—e.g., of what happens when a gas disperses from a pressurised
bottle. This makes it sound as if the problem is that we can’t make the gas behave
in the opposite way—we can’t make it put itself back into the bottle. Famously,
Loschmidt’s reversibility objection rested on pointing out that the reverse motion
is equally compatible with the laws of mechanics. Some responses to this problem
concentrate on the issue as to why we can’t actually reverse the motions (at least
in most cases).5
This response misses the interesting point, however. The interesting issue turns
on a numerical imbalance in nature between ‘forward’ and ‘reverse’ processes, not
case-by-case irreversibility of individual processes. Consider a parity analogy. Imag-
ine a world containing many left hands but few right hands. Such a world shows an
interesting parity asymmetry, even if any individual left hand can easily be trans-
formed into a right hand. Conversely, a world with equal numbers of left and right
hands is not interestingly P-asymmetric, even if any individual left or right hand
cannot be reversed. Thus the interesting issue concerns the numerical asymmetry
between the two kinds of structures—here, left hands and right hands—not the
question whether one can be transformed into the other.
Similarly in the thermodynamic case, in my view. The important thing to
explain is the numerical imbalance in nature between entropy-increasing processes
and their T-reversed counterparts, not the practical irreversibility of individual
processes.
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3.2 Asymmetry in time versus asymmetry of time
Writers on the thermodynamic asymmetry often write as if the problem of explain-
ing this asymmetry is the problem of explaining ‘the direction of time’. This may
be a harmless way of speaking, but we should keep in mind that the real puzzle
concerns the asymmetry of physical processes in time, not an asymmetry of time
itself. By analogy, imagine a long narrow room, architecturally symmetrical end-to-
end. Now suppose all the chairs in the room are facing the same end. Then there’s
a puzzle about the asymmetry in the arrangement of the chairs, but not a puzzle
about the asymmetry of the room. Similarly, the thermodynamic asymmetry is an
asymmetry of the ‘contents’ of time, not an asymmetry of the container itself.
It may be helpful to make a few remarks about the phrase ‘direction of time’.
Although this expression is in common use, it isn’t at all clear what it could actually
mean, if we try to take it literally. Often the thought seems to be that there is an
objective sense in which one time direction is future (or ‘positive’), and the other
past (or ‘negative’). But what could this distinction amount to? It’s easy enough
to make sense of idea that time is anisotropic—i.e., different in one direction than
in the other. For example, time might be finite in one direction but infinite in the
other. But this isn’t enough to give a direction to time, in above sense. After all, if
one direction were objectively the future or positive direction, then in the case of a
universe finite at one end, there would be two possibilities. Time might be finite in
the past, and or finite in the future. So anisotropy alone doesn’t give us direction.
Similarly, it seems, for any other physical time-asymmetry to which we might
appeal. If time did have a direction—an objective basis for a privileged notion of
positive or future time—then for any physical arrow or asymmetry in time, there
would always be a question as to whether that arrow pointed forwards or backwards.
And so no physical fact could answer this question, because for any candidate, the
same issue arises all over again. Thus the idea that time has a real direction seems
without any physical meaning. (Of course, we can use any asymmetry we like
as a basis for a conventional labelling—saying, for example, that we’ll regard the
direction in which entropy is increasing as the positive direction of time. But this
is different from discovering some intrinsic directionality to time itself.)
For present purposes, then, I’ll assume that it is a conventional matter which
direction we treat as positive or future time. Moreover, although it makes sense
to ask whether time is anisotropic, it seems clear that this is a different issue from
that of the thermodynamic asymmetry. As noted, the thermodynamic asymmetry
is an asymmetry of physical processes in time, not an asymmetry of time itself.
3.3 Entropy gradient not entropy increase
If it is conventional which direction counts as positive time, then it is also conven-
tional whether entropy increases or decreases. It increases by the lights of the usual
convention, but decreases if we reverse the labelling. But this may seem ridicu-
lous. Doesn’t it imply, absurdly, that the thermodynamic asymmetry is merely
conventional?
No. The crucial point is that while it’s a conventional matter whether the en-
tropy gradient slopes up or down, the gradient itself is objective. The puzzling
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asymmetry is that the gradient is monotonic—it slopes in the same direction ev-
erywhere (so far as we know).
It is worth noting that in principle there are two possible ways of contrasting this
monotonic gradient with a symmetric world. One contrast would be with a world
in which there are entropy gradients, but sometimes in one direction and sometimes
in the other—i.e., worlds in which entropy sometimes goes up and sometimes goes
down. The other contrast would be with worlds in which there are no significant
gradients, because entropy is always high. If we manage to explain the asymmetric
gradient we find in our world, we’ll be explaining why the world isn’t symmetric
in one of these ways—but which one? The answer isn’t obvious in advance, but
hopefully will fall out of a deeper understanding of the nature of the problem.
3.4 The term ‘entropy’ is inessential
A lot of time and ink has been devoted to the question how entropy should be
defined, or whether it can be defined at all in certain cases (e.g., for the universe as a
whole). It would be easy to get the impression that the puzzle of the thermodynamic
asymmetry depends on all this discussion—that whether there’s really a puzzle
depends on how, and whether, entropy can be defined, perhaps.
But in one important sense, these issues are beside the point. We can see
that there’s a puzzle, and go a long way towards saying what it is, without ever
mentioning entropy. We simply need to describe in other terms some of the many
processes which show the asymmetry—which occur with one temporal orientation
but not the other. For example, we can point out that there are lots of cases of big
difference in temperatures spontaneously equalising, but none of big differences in
temperature spontaneously arising. Or we can point out that there are lots of cases
of pressurised gas spontaneously leaving a bottle, but none of gas spontaneously
pressurising by entering a bottle. And so on.
In the end, we may need the notion of entropy to generalise properly over these
cases. However, we don’t need it to see that there’s a puzzle—to see that there’s
a striking imbalance in nature between systems with one orientation and systems
with the reverse orientation. For present purposes, then, we can ignore objections
based on problems in defining entropy. (Having said that, of course, we can go on
using the term entropy with a clear conscience, without worrying about how it’s
defined. In what follows, talk of entropy increase is just a placeholder for a list of
the actual phenomena which display the asymmetry we’re interested in.)
3.5 Summary
For the remainder of the paper, then, I take it (i) that the asymmetry in nature
is a matter of numerical imbalance between temporal mirror images, not of literal
reversibility; (ii) that we are concerned with an asymmetry of physical processes
in time, not with an asymmetry in time itself; (iii) that the objective asymmetry
concerned is a monotonic gradient, rather than an increase or a decrease; and (iv)
that if need be the term ‘entropy’ is to be thought of as a placeholder for the
relevant properties of a list of actual physical asymmetries.
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4 What would a solution look like? Two models
With our target more clearly in view, I now want to call attention to what may
be the most useful distinction of all, in making sense of the many things that
physicists and philosophers say about the thermodynamic asymmetry. This is a
distinction between two very different conceptions of what it would take to explain
the asymmetry—so different, in fact, that they disagree on how many distinct
violations of T-symmetry it takes to explain the observed asymmetry. On one
conception, an explanation needs two T-asymmetries. On the other conception, it
needs only one.
Despite this deep difference of opinion about what a solution would look like, the
distinction between these two approaches is hardly ever noted in the literature—
even by philosophers, who are supposed to have a nose for these things. So it is
easy for advocates of the different approaches to fail to see that they are talking at
cross-purposes—that in one important sense, they disagree about what the problem
is.
4.1 The two-asymmetry approach
Many approaches to the thermodynamic asymmetry look for a dynamical expla-
nation of the second law—a dynamical cause or factor, responsible for entropy
increase. Here are some examples, old and new:
1. The H-theorem. Oldest and most famous of all, this is Boltzmann’s devel-
opment of Maxwell’s idea that intermolecular collisions drive gases towards
equilibrium.
2. Interventionism. This alternative to the H -theorem, apparently first proposed
by S. H. Burbury in the 1890s,6,7 attributes entropy increase to the effects of
random and uncontrollable influences from a system’s external environment.
3. Indeterministic dynamics. There are various attempts to show how an inde-
terministic dynamics might account for the second law. A recent example is
a proposal that the stochastic collapse mechanism of the GRW approach to
quantum theory might also explain entropy increase.8,9
I stress two points about these approaches. First, if there is something dynam-
ical which makes entropy increase, then it needs to be time-asymmetric. Why?
Because otherwise it would force entropy to increase (or at least not to decrease)
in both directions—in other words, entropy would be constant. In the H -theorem,
for example, this asymmetry resides in the assumption of molecular chaos. In in-
terventionism, it is provided by the assumption that incoming influences from the
environment are ‘random’, or uncorrelated with the system’s internal dynamical
variables.
The second point to be stressed is that this asymmetry alone isn’t sufficient to
produce the observed thermodynamic phenomena. Something which forces entropy
to be non-decreasing won’t produce an entropy gradient unless entropy starts low.
To give us the observed gradient, in other words, this approach also needs a low
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entropy boundary condition—entropy has to be low in the past. This condition, too,
is time-asymmetric, and it’s a separate condition from the dynamical asymmetry.
(It is not guaranteed by the assumption of molecular chaos, for example.)
So this approach is committed to the claim that it takes two T-asymmetries—
one in the dynamics, and one in the boundary conditions—to explain the observed
asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomena. If this model is correct, explanation of
the observed asymmetry needs an explanation of both contributing asymmetries,
and the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow has become a double puzzle.
4.2 The one-asymmetry model
The two-asymmetry model isn’t the only model on offer, however. The main alter-
native was first proposed by Boltzmann in the 1870s,10 in response to Loschmidt’s
famous criticism of the H -theorem. To illustrate the new approach, think of a large
collection of gas molecules, isolated in a box with elastic walls. If the motion of
the molecules is governed by deterministic laws, such as Newtonian mechanics, a
specification of the microstate of the system at any one time uniquely determines
its entire trajectory. The key idea of Boltzmann’s new approach is that in the over-
whelming majority of possible trajectories, the system spends the overwhelming
majority of the time in a high entropy macrostate—among other things, a state in
which the gas is dispersed throughout the container. (Part of Boltzmann’s achieve-
ment was to find the appropriate way of counting possibilities, which we can call
the Boltzmann measure.)
Importantly, there is no temporal bias in this set of possible trajectories. Each
possible trajectory is matched by its time-reversed twin, just as Loschmidt had
pointed out, and the Boltzmann measure respects this symmetry. Asymmetry arises
only when we apply a low entropy condition at one end. For example, suppose
we stipulate that the gas is confined to some small region at the initial time t0.
Restricted to the remaining trajectories, the Boltzmann measure now provides a
measure of the likelihood of the various possibilities consistent with this boundary
condition. Almost all trajectories in this remaining set will be such that the gas
disperses after t0. The observed behaviour is thus predicted by the time-symmetric
measure, once we conditionalise on the low entropy condition at t0.
On this view, then, there’s no time-asymmetric factor which causes entropy to
increase. This is simply the most likely thing to happen, given the combination of
the time-symmetric Boltzmann probabilities and the single low entropy restriction
in the past. More below on the nature and origins of this low entropy boundary
condition. For the moment, the important thing is that although it is is time-
asymmetric, so far as we know, this is the only time-asymmetry in play, according
to Boltzmann’s statistical approach. There’s no need for a second asymmetry in
the dynamics.
5 Which is the right model?
It is important to distinguish these two models, but it would be even more useful
to know which of them is right. How many time-asymmetries should we be looking
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for, in trying to account for the thermodynamic asymmetry? This is a big topic,
but I’ll mention two factors, both of which seem to me to count in favour of the
one-asymmetry model.
The first factor is simplicity, or theoretical economy. If the one-asymmetry
approach works, it simply does more with less. In particular, it leaves us with only
one time-asymmetry to explain. True, this would not be persuasive if the two-
asymmetry approach actually achieved more than the one-asymmetry approach—if
the former had some big thoeretical advantage that the latter lacked. But the
second argument I want to mention suggests that this can’t be the case. On the
contrary, the second asymmetry seems redundant.
Redundancy is a strong charge, but consider the facts. The two-asymmetry
approach tries to identify some dynamical factor (collisions, or external influences,
or whatever) that causes entropy to increase—that makes a pressurised gas leave a
bottle, for example. However, to claim that one of these factors causes the gas to
disperse is to make the following ‘counterfactual’ claim: If the factor were absent,
the gas would not disperse (or would do so at a different rate, perhaps). But how
could the absence of collisions or external influences prevent the gas molecules from
leaving the bottle?
Here’s a way to make this more precise. In the terminology of Boltzmann’s
statistical approach, we can distinguish between normal initial microstates (for a
system, or for the universe as a whole), which lead to entropy increases much as we
observe, and abnormal microstates, which are such that something else happens.
The statistical approach rests on the fact that normal microstates are vastly more
likely than abnormal microstates, according to the Boltzmann measure.
In these terms, the above point goes as follows. The two-asymmetry approach is
committed to the claim that the universe begins in an abnormal microstate. Why?
Because in the case of normal initial microstates, entropy increases anyway, without
the mechanism in question—so the required counterfactual claim isn’t true.
It is hard to see what could justify this claim about the initial microstate. At
a more local level, why should we think that the initial microstate of a gas sample
in an open bottle is normally such that if it weren’t for collisions (or external
influences, or whatever), the molecules simply wouldn’t encounter the open top of
the bottle, and hence disperse?
Thus it is doubtful whether there is really any need for a dynamical asymme-
try, and the one-asymmetry model seems to offer the better conception of what it
would take to solve the puzzle of the thermodynamic asymmetry. But if so, then
the various two-asymmetry approaches—including Boltzmann’s own H -theorem,
which he himself defended in the 1890s, long after he first proposed the statistical
approach—are looking for a solution to the puzzle in the wrong place, at least in
part.
For present purposes, the main conclusion I want to emphasise is that we need to
make a choice. The one-asymmetry model and the two-asymmetry model represent
are two very different views of what it would take to explain the thermodynamic
arrow—of what the problem is, in effect. Unless we notice that they are different
approaches, and proceed to agree on which of them we ought to adopt, we can’t
possibly agree on whether the old puzzle has been laid to rest.
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6 The Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis—a no-asymmetry solution?
If the one-asymmetry view is correct, the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow is
really the puzzle of the low entropy boundary condition. Why is entropy so low in
the past? After all, in making it unmysterious why entropy doesn’t decrease in one
direction, the Boltzmann measure equally makes it mysterious why it does decrease
in the other—for the statistics themselves are time-symmetric.
Boltzmann himself was one of the first to see the importance of this issue. In a
letter to Nature in 1895, he suggests an explanation, based on an idea he attributes
to ‘my old assistant, Dr Schuetz’.11 He notes that although low entropy states
are very unlikely, they are very likely to occur eventually, given enough time. If
the universe is very old, it will have had time to produce the kind of low entropy
region we find ourselves inhabiting simply by accident. ‘Assuming the universe
great enough, the probability that such a small part of it as our world should be in
its present state, is no longer small,’ as Boltzmann puts it.
Entropy
Time
  B   CA
Figure 1. Boltzmann’s entropy curve.
It is one thing to explain why the universe contains regions like ours, another
to explain why we find ourselves in such a region. If they are so rare, isn’t it more
likely that we’d find ourselves somewhere else? But Boltzmann suggests an answer
to this, too. Suppose, as seems plausible, that creatures like us couldn’t exist in
the vast regions of near-equilibrium between such regions of low entropy. Then
it’s no surprise that we find ourselves in such an unlikely place. As Boltzmann
himself puts it, ‘the ... H curve would form a representation of what takes place in
the universe. The summits of the curve would represent the worlds where visible
motion and life exist.’
Figure 1 shows what Boltzmann calls the H curve, except that this diagram plots
entropy rather than Boltzmann’s quantity H. Entropy is low when H is high, so the
summits of Boltzmann’s H curve are the troughs of the entropy curve. The universe
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spends most of its time very close to equilibrium. But occasionally—much more
rarely than this diagram actually suggests—a random re-arrangement of matter
produces a state of low entropy. As the resulting state returns to equilibrium,
there’s an entropy slope, such as the one on which we (apparently) find ourselves,
at a point such as A.
Why do we find ourselves on an uphill rather than a downhill slope, as at B?
In another paper, Boltzmann offers a remarkable proposal to explain this, too.12
Perhaps our perception of past and future depends on the entropy gradient, in such
a way that we are bound to regard the future as lying ‘uphill’. Thus the perceived
direction of time would not be objective, but a product of our own orientation in
time. Creatures at point B would see the future as lying in the other direction,
and there’s no objective sense in which they are wrong and we are right, or vice
versa. Boltzmann compares this to the discovery that spatial up and down are not
absolute directions, the same for all observers everywhere.
For present purposes, what matters about the Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis is
that it offers an explanation of the local asymmetry of thermodynamics in terms
which are symmetric on a larger scale. So it is a no-asymmetry solution—the puzzle
of the thermodynamic asymmetry simply vanishes on the large scale.
7 The big problem
Unfortunately, however, this clever proposal has a sting in its tail, a sting so serious
that it now seems almost impossible to take the hypothesis seriously. The problem
flows directly from Boltzmann’s own link between entropy and probability. In
Figure 1, the vertical axis is a logarithmic probability scale. For every downward
increment, dips in the curve of the corresponding depth are exponentially more
improbable. So a dip of the depth of point A or point B is much more likely to
occur in the form shown at point C—where the given depth is very close to the
minimum of the fluctuation—than in association with a much bigger dip, as at A
and B. Hence if our own region has a past of even lower entropy, it is much more
improbable than it needs to be, given its present entropy. So far, this point seems to
have been appreciated already in the 1890s, in exchanges between Boltzmann and
Zermelo. What doesn’t seem to have appreciated is its devastating consequence,
namely, that according to the Boltzmann measure it is much easier to produce fake
records and memories, than to produce the real events of which they purport to be
records.
Why does this consequence follow? Well, imagine that the universe is vast
enough to contain many separate fluctuations, each containing everything that we
see around us, including the complete works of Shakespeare, in all their twenty-first
century editions. Now imagine choosing one of these fluctuations at random. It
is vastly more likely that we’ll select a case in which the Shakespearean texts are
a product of a spontaneous recent fluctuation, than one in which they were really
written four hundred years earlier by a poet called William Shakespeare. Why?
Simply because entropy is much higher now than it was in the sixteenth century
(as we normally assume that century to have been). Recall that according to
Boltzmann, probability increases exponentially with entropy. Fluctuations like our
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twenty-first century—‘Shakespearian’ texts and all—thus occur much more often
in typical world-histories than fluctuations like the lower-entropy sixteenth century.
So almost all fluctuations including the former don’t include the latter. The same
goes for the rest of history—all our ‘records’ and ‘memories’ are almost certainly
misleading.
To make this conclusion vivid we can take advantage of the fact that in the
Boltzmann picture, there isn’t an objective direction of time. So we can equally
well think about the question of ‘what it takes’ to produce what we see around us
from the reverse of the normal temporal perspective. Think of starting in what
we call the future, and moving in the direction we call towards the past. Think
of all the apparently miraculous accidents it takes to produce the kind of world
we see around us. Among other things, our bodies themselves, and our editions of
Shakespeare, have to ‘undecompose’, at random, from (what we normally think of
as) their future decay products. That’s obviously extremely unlikely, but the fact
that we’re here shows that it happens. But now think of what it takes to get even
further back, to a sixteenth century containing Shakespeare himself. The same kind
of near-miracle needs to happen many more times. Among other things, there are
several billion intervening humans to ‘undecompose’ spontaneously from dust.
So the Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis implies that our apparent historical evi-
dence is almost certainly unreliable. So far as I know, this point is first made in
print by von Weizsa¨cker in 1939.13 Von Weizsa¨cker notes that ‘improbable states
can count as documents [i.e., records of the past] only if we presuppose that still less
probable states preceded them.’ He concludes that ‘the most probable situation by
far would be that the present moment represents the entropy minimum, while the
past, which we infer from the available documents, is an illusion.’
Von Weizsa¨cker also notes that there’s another problem of a similar kind. The
Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis implies that as we look further out into space, we
should expect to find no more order than we already have reason to believe in. But
we can now observe vastly more of the universe than was possible in Boltzmann’s
day, and there seems to be low entropy all the way out.
So the Boltzmann-Schuetz hypothesis faces some profound objections. Fortu-
nately, as we’re about to see, modern cosmology goes at least some way to providing
us with an alternative.
8 Initial smoothness
We have seen that the observed thermodynamic asymmetry requires that entropy
was low in the past. Low entropy requires concentrations of energy in useable
forms, and presumably there are many ways such concentrations could exist in the
universe. On the face of it, we seem to have no reason to expect any particularly neat
or simple story about how it works in the real world—about where the particular
concentrations of energy we depend on happen to originate. Remarkably, however,
modern cosmology suggests that all the observed low entropy is associated with a
single characteristic of the early universe, soon after the big bang. The crucial thing
is that matter is distributed extremely smoothly in the early universe. This provides
a vast reservoir of low entropy, on which everything else depends. In particular,
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smoothness is necessary for galaxy and star formation, and most familiar irreversible
phenomena depend on the sun.
Why does a smooth arrangement of matter amount to a low entropy state?
Because in a system dominated by an attractive force such as gravity, a uniform
distribution of matter is highly unstable (and provides a highly useable supply of
potential energy). However, about 105 years after the big bang, matter seems to
have been distributed smoothly to very high accuracy.
One way to get a sense how surprising this is, is to recall that we’ve found no
reason to disagree with Boltzmann’s suggestion that there’s no objective distinction
between past and future—no sense in which things really happen in the direction we
think of as past-to-future. Without such a distinction, there’s no objective sense in
which the big bang is not equally the end point of a gravitational collapse. Somehow
that collapse is coordinated with astounding accuracy, so that the matter involved
manages to avoid forming large agglomerations (in fact, black holes), and instead
spreads itself out very evenly across the universe. (By calculating the entropy of
black holes with comparable mass, Penrose14 has estimated the probability of such
a smooth arrangement of matter at 10−10
123
.)
In my view, this discovery about the cosmological origins of low entropy is one
of the great achievements of late twentieth century physics. It is a remarkable
discovery in two quite distinct ways, in fact. First, it is the only anomaly nec-
essary to account for the low entropy we find in the universe, at least so far as
we know. So it is a remarkable theoretical achievement—it wraps up the entire
puzzle of the thermodynamic asymmetry into a single package, in effect. Second,
it is astounding that it happens at all, according to existing theories of how grav-
itating matter should behave (which suggests, surely, that there is something very
important missing from those theories).b
9 Open questions
Why is the universe smooth soon after the big bang? This is a major puzzle, but—
if we accept that the one-asymmetry model—it is the only question we need to
answer, to solve the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow. So we have an answer to
the question with which we began. What has happened to the puzzle noticed by
those nineteenth century giants? It has been transformed by some of their twentieth
century successors into a puzzle for cosmology, a puzzle about the early universe.
It is far from clear how this remaining cosmological puzzle is to be explained.
Indeed, there are some who doubt whether it needs explaining.15,16,17 But these
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. I want to close by calling attention to
some open questions associated with this understanding of the origins of the ther-
modynamic asymmetry, and by making a case for an unusually sceptical attitude
to the second law.
bTrue, it is easy to fail to see how astounding the smooth early universe is, by failing to see that
the big bang can quite properly be regarded as the end point of a gravitational collapse. But
anyone inclined to deny the validity of this way of viewing the big bang faces a perhaps even more
daunting challenge: to explain what is meant by, and what is the evidence for, the claim that time
has an objective direction!
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One fascinating question is whether whatever explains why the universe is
smooth after the big bang would also imply that the universe would be smooth
before the big crunch, if the universe eventually recollapses. In other words, would
entropy would eventually decrease, in a recollapsing universe? This possibility was
first suggested by Thomas Gold some forty years ago.18 It has often been dismissed
on the grounds that a smooth recollapse would require an incredibly unlikely ‘con-
spiracy’ among the components parts of the universe, to ensure that the recollapsing
matter did not clump into black holes. However, as we have already noted, this
incredible conspiracy is precisely what happens towards (what we usually term)
the big bang, if we regard that end of the universe as a product of a gravitational
collapse. The statistics themselves are time-symmetric. If something overrides
them at one end of the universe, what right do we have to assume that the same
does not happen at the other? Until we understand more about the origins of the
smooth early universe, then, it seems best to keep an open mind about a smooth
late universe.
Another interesting and open question is whether a future low entropy boundary
condition would have effects now. Events at the present era provide us with evidence
of a low entropy past. Could there also be evidence of a low entropy future? The
answer depends on our temporal distance from such a future boundary condition,
in relation to the relaxation time of cosmological processes. It has been argued that
a symmetric time-reversing universe would require more radiation in the present
era than we actually observe—radiation which in the reversed time sense originates
in the stars and galaxies of the opposite end of the universe.19 But because of its
anti-thermodynamic character, from our point of view, it is doubtful whether this
radiation would be detectable, at least by standard means.2
Some people dismiss the question whether entropy would reverse in a recollaps-
ing universe on the grounds that the current evidence suggests that the universe will
not recollapse. However, it seems reasonable to expect that when we find out why
the universe is smooth near the big bang, we’ll be able to ask a theoretical question
about what that reason would imply in the case of universe which did recollapse.
Moreover, as a number of writers have pointed out,20,21 much the same question
arises if just a bit of the universe recollapses—e.g., a galaxy, collapsing into a black
hole. This process seems to be a miniature version of the gravitational collapse of
a whole universe, and so it makes sense to ask whether whatever constrains the big
bang also constrains such partial collapses.
10 Scepticism about the second law
In my view, the moral of these considerations is that until we know more about
why entropy is low in the past, it is sensible to keep an open mind about whether it
might be low in the future. The appropriate attitude is a kind of healthy scepticism
about the universality of the second law of thermodynamics.
The case for scepticism goes like this. What we’ve learnt about why entropy
increases in our region is that it does so because it is very low in the past (for some
reason we don’t yet know), and the increase we observe is the most likely outcome
consistent with that restriction. As noted, however, the statistics underpinning
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this reasoning are time-symmetric, and hence the predictions we make about the
future depend implicitly on the assumption that there is no corresponding low
entropy boundary condition in that direction. Thus the Boltzmann probabilities
don’t enable us to predict without qualification that entropy is unlikely to decrease,
but only that it is unlikely to decrease, unless there is the kind of boundary condition
in the future that makes entropy low in the past. In other words, the second law is
likely to continue to hold so long as there isn’t a low entropy boundary condition in
the future. But it can’t be used to exclude this possibility—even probabilistically!
Sceptics about the second law are unusual in the history of thermodynamics,
and I would like to finish by giving some long-overdue credit to one of the rare
exceptions. Samuel Hawksley Burbury (1831–1911) was not one of the true giants of
thermodynamics. However, he made an important contribution to the identification
of the puzzle of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomena. And he was
more insightful than any of his contemporaries—and most writers since, for that
matter—in being commendably cautious about declaring the puzzle solved.
Burbury was an English barrister. He read mathematics at Cambridge as an
undergraduate, but his major work in mathematical physics came late in life, when
deafness curtailed his career at the Bar. In his sixties and seventies, he thus played
an important in discussions about the nature and origins of the second law. In a
review of Burbury’s monograph The Kinetic Theory of Gases for Science in 1899,
the reviewer describes his contribution as follows:
[I]n that very interesting discussion of the Kinetic Theory which was begun
at the Oxford meeting of the British Association in 1894 and continued
for months afterwards in Nature, Mr. Burbury took a conspicuous part,
appearing as the expounder and defender of Boltzmann’s H-theorem in
answer to the question which so many [had] asked in secret, and which
Mr. Culverwell asked in print, ‘What is the H-theorem and what does it
prove?’ Thanks to this discussion, and to the more recent publication of
Boltzmann’s Vorlesungen u¨ber Gas-theorie, and finally to this treatise by
Burbury, the question is not so difficult to answer as it was a few years
ago.22
It is a little misleading to call Burbury a defender of the H -theorem. The crucial
issue in the debate referred to here was the source of the time-asymmetry of the H -
theorem, and while Burbury was the first to put his finger on the role of assumption
of molecular chaos, he himself regarded this assumption with considerable suspicion.
Here’s how he puts it in 1904:
Does not the theory of a general tendency of entropy to diminish [sic]c
take too much for granted? To a certain extent it is supported by exper-
imental evidence. We must accept such evidence as far as it goes and no
further. We have no right to supplement it by a large draft of the scientific
imagination.23
cBurbury is apparently referring to Boltzmann’s quantity H, which does decrease as entropy
increases.
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Burbury’s reasons for scepticism are not precisely those which seem appropriate
today. Burbury’s concern might be put like this. To see that the dynamical pro-
cesses routinely fail to produce entropy increases towards the past is to see that it
takes an extra ingredient to ensure that they do so towards the future. We’re then
surely right to wonder whether that extra ingredient is sufficiently universal, even
towards the future, to guarantee that the second law will always hold. As the first
clearly to identify the source of the time-asymmetry in the H -theorem, Burbury
was perhaps more sensitive to this concern than any of his contemporaries.
At the same time, however, Burbury seems never to have distanced himself
sufficiently from the H -theorem to see that the real puzzle of the thermodynamic
asymmetry lies elsewhere. The interesting question is not whether there is a good
dynamical argument to show that entropy will alway increase towards the future.
It is why entropy steadily decreases towards the past—in the face, note, of such
things as the effects of collisions and external influences, which are ‘happening’ in
that direction as much as in the other! As we’ve seen, this re-orientation provides
a new reason for being cautious about proclaiming the universal validity of the
second law. Once we regard the fact that entropy decreases towards the past as
itself a puzzle, as something in need of explanation, then it ought to occur to us
that whatever explains it might be non-unique—and thus that in principle, there
might be a low entropy boundary condition in the future, as well as in the past.
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